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ExEcutivE summary
1. Turkey’s foreign policy under the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) has been active and ambitious. In terms of its un-
derlying assumptions and actual practices, it differs consid-
erably from the policies that the Turkish Republic pursued in 
previous decades. However, the results of Turkey’s policy are 
inversely proportional to its ambitions, and the country is be-
coming increasingly alienated on the international stage. 
2. Once the West’s ally, Turkey has been an ever more problem-
atic partner in recent years. The Turkish leadership no longer 
views the alliance with the European Union and membership 
in NATO as based on shared values; rather, it is now merely 
a cherry-picked and shaky community of interests. It is also 
no longer underpinned by aspirations to civilizational devel-
opment based on European norms and values, as it used to be. 
Turkey is drifting away from the West, which can be seen in 
the clear weakening of its political ties with the EU and the 
USA, ever more frequent misunderstandings and crises in 
mutual relations and the two sides’ divergent positions on 
current challenges such as the war in Syria, the Islamic State 
problem or the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. 
3. Turkey is also increasingly alienated politically in the Mid-
dle East. Ankara has been making consistent efforts to es-
tablish itself as a regional leader. This aspiration has not only 
been viewed as a matter of security or the economy, but also as 
a fulfilment of Turkey’s historic mission and a prerequisite of 
the country’s rise to the status of a global power. Nonetheless, 
in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the regional develop-
ments which followed, Ankara has lost much of the influence it 
had built in the Middle East and North Africa in previous years.
4. Turkey’s growing international isolation is a consequence of 
the country ever more fully subordinating its foreign policy 
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to the ideology of the ruling AKP. The world vision offered by 
that ideology does not square with the diagnoses of Turkey’s 
partners. The objectives it sets for Turkish foreign policy are 
incompatible with its partners’ expectations. Moreover, a for-
eign policy rooted in ideology is less flexible and less capable of 
adjusting to current international dynamics. 
5. AKP ideology has its roots in the conservative, anti-Western 
traditions of the Millî Görüş movement and the concepts de-
veloped by leading AKP politicians, especially the prime min-
ister Ahmet Davutoğlu. At its core is a system of dogmas about 
Turkey’s internal situation, its place in the world, its historical 
mission, and the evolution of the international relations. The 
ideology envisages a comprehensive reconstruction of society, 
the state and its foreign policy, with a view to making Turkey 
a modern global power, although rooted in its traditions. Ini-
tiating identity changes in Turkish society and injecting an 
ambition to the public to make Turkey a global power (boost-
ing the so-called “national will”) are supposed to be crucial for 
achieving this end. 
6. Unless there is a change of leadership in Turkey (which is un-
likely to happen in the coming years) or the state slips into 
deep instability, Turkey will continue to see the international 
situation through the lens of AKP ideology. This ideology will 
define the strategic objectives and suggest tactical solutions, 
even despite the failures of Turkey’s foreign policy in the short 
term and its international alienation. Ibrahim Kalın, one of 
AKP’s leading figures, has summed up this attitude in the 
phrase “alone in virtue”. 
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
4/
20
15
7
introduction
When it came to power in 2002, the Justice and Development Par-
ty (AKP) embarked on a thorough reconstruction of the Turkish 
state, society and politics. The first two terms of the AKP govern-
ment (2002–2011) brought about considerable modernisation and 
democratisation of the state, a calming down of the political scene 
in Turkey, rapid economic growth and unprecedented interna-
tional activity. Those changes were appreciated in the West and 
led the EU and the United States to hope that the alliance and co-
operation on international issues with Turkey could be strength-
ened. 
Building a “New Turkey” has been the slogan of Turkey’s transfor-
mation in recent years. During this period, the AKP has consider-
ably consolidated its grip on power and revised its policies, leading 
to a rise of authoritarianism in Turkey and the country’s growing 
alienation on the international stage. It was not merely the result 
of tactical errors on the part of Ankara or a temporarily unfavour-
able situation in Turkey’s surroundings. The processes in question 
have deeper roots – they are a consequence of the country’s policy 
being subordinated to the AKP’s ideology. In line with the slogan 
under which it is being implemented, it could be termed the “New 
Turkish ideology”. 
At the moment there are no alternative politico-ideological pro-
jects in Turkey – nor are any emerging on the horizon – that could 
match the New Turkish ideology’s popularity, attractiveness, co-
herence or universality. Neither is there any political power (par-
ty or community) that could challenge the AKP’s monopoly on 
power in the coming years. Thus, the New Turkish ideology will 
likely remain the main guiding principle of Turkish policy. 
This paper looks into the way in which Turkey’s foreign policy has 
been subordinated to the precepts of AKP ideology. The first part 
outlines the origins and the main currents of that ideology. The 
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second part discusses Turkey’s efforts to implement this ideol-
ogy in its foreign policy, especially towards the Middle East and 
the West, but also globally. The third part is a reflection upon the 
consequences that pursuing the AKP political ideology has had on 
Turkey’s international standing. 
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i. thE “nEw turkEy’s” idEological origins 
That part of the AKP’s political ideology, which directly influences 
its foreign policy, stems from two sources. Firstly, it draws on the 
ideas which the leading AKP politicians took from the conserva-
tive, anti-Western Millî Görüş community in which they started 
their political careers. Secondly, it is based on the concepts of 
foreign policy and global order dynamics developed by Ahmet 
Davutoğlu. 
During its first two terms in power (2002–2011), the AKP leader-
ship was to some extent influenced by the ideology of the Fethul-
lah Gülen socio-religious movement (the so called cemaat), an 
ally of AKP’s which advocated Turkey’s integration with the EU, 
a close alliance with the United States and co-operation with Isra-
el. However, in late 2011 a conflict broke out between the Turkish 
leadership and the Gülen movement and since that moment (and 
especially since December 2013) the cemaat has become marginal-
ised and lost its influence on foreign policy. It will therefore not be 
analysed here.1 
During the AKP government’s third term, the ideological profile 
of the AKP team and the diplomatic service also became much 
more homogenous. Those members of the party and the admin-
istration who did not agree with the interpretation of the New 
Turkish ideology imposed by the party leadership have been ef-
fectively marginalised and their influence on Turkey’s foreign 
policy is negligible today.
1 For more information about the Gülen movement see: Günter Seufert, Is 
the Fethullah Gülen Movement Overstretching Itself? A Turkish Religious 
Community as a National and International Player, SWP Research Paper, 
January 2014, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/
research_papers/2014_RP02_srt.pdf
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1. AKP – the ideological successor of Millî Görüş
When the AKP came to power in 2002 it had existed for just over 
one year. However, its founders and leaders, including Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan (who would later become prime minister and 
subsequently president), Abdullah Gül (the future prime minis-
ter, foreign minister and president) and Bülent Arınç (future par-
liament speaker and deputy prime minister) had participated in 
Turkey’s political life for years. They had very clear world visions, 
expectations about Turkey’s place in the global order and a dis-
tinct vision of the foreign policy that Ankara should pursue. Their 
worldview was rooted in the ideology of the Millî Görüş move-
ment to which they had belonged for most of their active political 
careers before they founded the AKP.
The Millî Görüş (or National Vision) movement was founded by 
Necmettin Erbakan in 1969 as a response to Turkey’s forced so-
cial and cultural modernisation that started with the reforms of 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and continued under his successors in 
the form of Kemalism. According to Millî Görüş members, at the 
roots of Turkey’s problems were the Westernisation and abandon-
ment of the Ottoman Empire’s traditions and Islamic values. The 
movement sought to propose a new social order that would draw 
on such Western achievements as democracy, industrialisation 
and new technologies. But at the same time be strongly rooted in 
Turkey’s culture and religion, and especially the traditions of the 
people of Anatolia, who had been kept on the margins of political 
life as a result of the Kemalist social engineering.
Millî Görüş rejected what had been the established line of Tur-
key’s foreign policy since World War II. That policy line had been 
based on an alliance with the United States, regarded as a guar-
antee of security and protection from the Soviet threat (in prac-
tice it meant Turkey’s subordination to Washington), as well as 
membership in NATO and aspirations to integrate with Western 
Europe. Relations with the Middle East were very limited, usually 
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frigid and subordinated to the United States’ Cold War strategy. 
Millî Görüş members, including those who are in AKP today, were 
opposed to Turkey’s integration with the West, which they identi-
fied with imperialism, exploitation and a threat to Islam. That vi-
sion had strong anti-Semitic, anti-Israeli overtones and was based 
on conspiracy theories according to which the Jews played a lead-
ing role in creating the West’s destructive policies.
Millî Görüş representatives called for the development of clos-
er relations with the Islamic world and for the creation of a just 
global order that would not be dominated by the United States. 
Turkey was supposed to play a leading, integrating role in creat-
ing that new order, just as the Ottoman Empire did vis-à-vis the 
subordinated peoples before the reform period in the 19th centu-
ry, which was supposed to bring about Western modernisation 
but, from the movement’s point of view, contributed to the Em-
pire’s collapse.2 Millî Görüş maintained close ideological, insti-
tutional and personal relations with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Like the Brotherhood, it cherished the idea of pan-Islamism and 
its tenet of a community bringing together all Muslims irrespec-
tive of their adherence to the different currents of Islam (Sunni, 
Shia, or Sufi), above political divisions. This attitude permitted 
the movement to take a positive view of the Islamic revolution in 
Shia-dominated Iran.3
2 The call for a return to the Ottoman Empire’s tradition was in effect a veiled 
form of advocacy for a re-Islamisation of Turkey. The Kemalist establish-
ment treated promoting Islam as a threat to the constitutional order and 
imposed repression against those involved. This is why the Millî Görüş 
community promoted Ottoman traditions as “cover” for their aspirations 
to re-Islamise Turkey. Over time, however, the Ottoman nostalgia became 
important on its own. M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, 
Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 212.
3 Millî Görüş and the Muslim Brotherhood first established close relations in 
Germany where the former reached the peak of its institutional develop-
ment during the period when Erbakan was an émigré in Germany. Erbakan 
was strongly influenced by the Brotherhood’s ideology, including its theol-
ogy, anti-Semitism and contempt for the West. Personal links were also es-
tablished between Millî Görüş and the Brotherhood: Erbakan’s niece mar-
ried Ibrahim El-Zayat, the chief of the Brotherhood’s German branch. For 
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The movement’s vision found its fullest reflection in Turkey’s pol-
icy when Erbakan was prime minister in the years 1996–1997. In 
that period Ankara strove to establish close relations with Iran, 
Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, all sharing a hostile attitude 
towards the West and Israel. It even sought rapprochement with 
Libya, then under sanctions for terrorism, and to this end conclud-
ed an agreement with Tripoli on co-operation in the fight against 
terrorism.4 In that period the most populous Muslim states, act-
ing on Erbakan’s initiative, established the D8 organisation with 
a view to creating a counterbalance to the G7.5 The Turkish prime 
minister’s list of foreign visits was filled up almost exclusively 
with Muslim destinations and did not include a single Western 
state. On taking power, Erbakan pledged to loosen the ties with 
NATO, dismantle the Turkish-EU customs union, withdraw from 
the informal alliance with Israel and quit the United Nations. He 
did not manage to deliver on these promises because his position 
in the ruling coalition was not strong enough for that (and also for 
pragmatic reasons – he feared the political consequences).6
more information on the links between Millî Görüş and the AKP on the one 
hand, and the Muslim Brotherhood on the other, see: Steven G. Merley, Tur-
key, the Global, Muslim Brotherhood and the Gaza Flotilla, Jerusalem Center 
for Public Affairs, 2011. http://www.jcpa.org/text/Turkey_Muslim_Broth-
erhood.pdf
4 Ideological reasons were particularly important here. Speaking at a joint 
press conference with Erbakan, Muammar Gaddafi backed the terrorist 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which was in a state of war with Turkey at 
that time. Despite that, Erbakan wanted to co-operate with Libya and pur-
sue the idea of a Muslim coalition.
5 The D8 members, aside from Turkey, were Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria and Pakistan. 
6 For more information on the Erbakan government’s foreign policy see: Alan 
Makovsky, How to deal with Erbakan, Middle East Quarterly, March 1997, 
Vol. 4, No. 1, and Galip Dalay, Dov Friedman, The AK Party and the Evolution 
of Turkish Political Islam’s Foreign Policy, Insight Turkey, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2013. 
http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/20130415155719_15_2_2013_dalay.
pdf. For more information on Necmettin Erbakan and Millî Görüş see: David 
Vielhaber, The Milli Görüs of Germany, Current Trends in Islamist Ideol-
ogy, Vol. 13, 2012, https://hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attach-
ment/1268/vielhaber.pdf
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Erbakan and his aides repeatedly faced repression for undermin-
ing the foreign and internal policy paradigm in force in Turkey 
because the Kemalist establishment, and especially the military, 
viewed Millî Görüş as a threat to the constitutional order and the 
secular nature of the state. As part of the repressive measures, 
Erbakan’s successive parties were banned and in 1997 his govern-
ment was forced to resign under pressure from the military.7 The 
crackdowns against Millî Görüş were often approved of by the 
United States, which strengthened the conviction that there ex-
isted a Kemalist-Western alliance against the conservative com-
munities in Turkey.
The politicians who later became AKP leaders, including Erdoğan, 
Gül and Arınç, were actively involved in developing and imple-
menting the policies of Erbakan’s party, even in the face of perse-
cution, which shows their ideological commitment and determi-
nation at the time.8
However, it would be an oversimplification to say that they have 
been continuing the movement’s policy. When founding the AKP, 
they distanced themselves from the anti-Western rhetoric, de-
clared they would aspire to membership in the EU, did not put as 
much focus on the importance of Islam as Erbakan had done, and 
were not hostile towards Israel. It is an open question whether 
this “pro-Western” turn was a genuine geopolitical and civiliza-
tional choice, or a tactical manoeuvre intended to serve the pur-
poses of internal politics (expanding the potential electorate and 
eliminating the military from politics), the economy and foreign 
policy. The motivations of AKP politicians that have been behind 
Turkey’s gradual turning away from the EU in recent years are 
also a subject of debate: is the turn the effect of the absence of any 
7 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was a member of Erbakan’s party at that time and 
had been elected the mayor of Istanbul from its slate, was also forced to step 
down and subsequently imprisoned for publicly reciting an Islamic poem.
8 Abdullah Gül, who later became prime minister, foreign minister and presi-
dent designated by the AKP, was Erbakan’s chief foreign policy advisor.
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real possibility to integrate with the EU, or rather a manifestation 
of the AKP’s genuine worldview preferences? Or maybe it reflects 
an evolution in the Turkish leaders’ thinking: from pro-European 
attitudes towards scepticism?9 In any case, the fact that Turkey’s 
policy during the AKP’s third term in power has been increasing-
ly in keeping with the old precepts of Millî Görüş proves that the 
party is strongly rooted in that tradition.10 Even if the AKP does 
not take direct political guidance from the movement’s ideals, 
they do constitute an important element in the party’s mentality 
and worldview, and at least partly explain its scepticism towards 
the West, aversion to Israel, nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire and 
aspirations for Turkey to become the leader of the Islamic world. 
Furthermore, the conviction that the United States supported the 
Turkish military in its repressions against Millî Görüş reinforces 
the distrust towards the West displayed by AKP politicians today.
2. Ahmet Davutoğlu’s concept
The Millî Görüş ideology offers an insight into the general world-
view of the AKP. However, it takes an analysis of the academic 
works of Ahmet Davutoğlu, the main architect of Turkey’s foreign 
policy, to explain the ideological and theoretical underpinnings of 
Turkey’s policy in more detail. Davutoğlu has been the main for-
eign policy advisor to the prime ministers Gül and Erdoğan, then 
served as the minister of foreign affairs (2009–2013), and has been 
the prime minister of Turkey since 2014. However, before starting 
9 Edelman, Cornell, Lobel and Makovsky suggest that even if the AKP politi-
cians wanted Turkey’s integration with the EU at some point, the change of 
mind was so shallow that they quite easily reverted to their original views 
once they encountered objective obstacles (including opposition from the 
EU). See Eric S. Edelman, Svante E. Cornell, Aaron Lobel, Michael Mako-
vsky, The Roots of Turkish Conduct: Understanding the Evolution of Turkish 
Policy in the Middle East, Bipartisan Policy Centre, December 2013, p. 25. 
10 The attachment to the Millî Görüş tradition was also visible in the attempts 
to incorporate into the AKP the direct successors of Erbakan’s last party, in-
cluding members of the Saadet party (and the HAS party), and in particular 
Numan Kurtulmuş (currently one of AKP leaders and advisor to the prime 
minister). 
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his political career, Davutoğlu was an academician. In that capac-
ity he developed a comprehensive international policy concept 
and formulated a new vision for Turkey’s foreign policy, including 
both theoretical foundations and specific practical recommenda-
tions.11 It was because of his research that he was invited to join 
politics. This demonstrates how his concepts appealed to the AKP 
leadership. Davutoğlu enjoys special authority and is trusted by 
president Erdoğan. This has enabled him to progress so fast up 
the political ladder and implement his ideas, despite the fact that 
for a long time he did not have an established position in the party.
According to Davutoğlu’s concepts, the bipolar Cold War world 
system, and the United States’ hegemony which followed it, were 
a historical anomaly, a transitory period that is now coming to an 
end.12 The international system is now entering a phase in which 
traditions, culture and historical heritage, i.e. what Davutoğlu 
calls “historical depth”, will play a role alongside the traditional 
hallmarks of power such as geographical location, military might, 
economic prowess or demographic potential. In order to gain the 
status of a global power, a state needs to skilfully use all these ele-
ments. The global power status is reserved for a small number of 
“ancient powers”, which, unlike the younger state entities, pos-
sess historical depth. Turkey, the successor of the Ottoman Em-
pire, is counted among the ancient powers along with China, In-
dia, some European powers and others.
11 The principal work in which Ahmet Davutoğlu explained his concepts is ti-
tled “Strategic depth” (Stratejik Derinlik) and its first edition was published 
in 2001. Since then, the book has had more than 40 editions in Turkey, which 
shows that the author still considers it to be significant and that the concepts 
presented in the book are popular in Turkey. There are two theories of why 
Davutoğlu has never let the book be translated into English. According to one, 
it was in protest against the dominance of the English language in research. 
According to the other, the author fears that the claims presented in the book 
could be too controversial for external readers and if they were published, it 
would be more difficult for the author to pursue his foreign policy. 
12 Transcript of the interview with Ahmet Davutoğlu, Yüzyıllık parantezi 
kapatacağız, Yeni Şafak, 1.03.2013, http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/yazidizileri/
yuzyillik-parantezi-kapatacagiz-494795
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According to Davutoğlu, the Republic Turkey artificially cut it-
self off from its Ottoman heritage and, in contrast to the Empire, 
became an introverted state focused on its internal problems or 
divisions and conflicts with neighbours. This had its roots in the 
fact that external actors had imposed an international system on 
it that served their particular interests.13 Ankara in that period 
had no strategy of its own, and was merely an instrument in the 
hands of the United States, serving the purposes of the US Cold 
War policy and subsequently, its pursuit of global hegemony. By 
focusing too much on integration with the European Union, it 
failed to take advantage of its potential stemming from its links 
with Asia and the Muslim world. Subordinating relations with 
the Middle East to its alliance with the West neither served Tur-
key’s interests in the region, nor achieved the expected results, 
i.e. integration with the EU.14
Davutoğlu therefore calls for an end to the “peripheral mentality” 
in politics and urges an awakening of the “national will”, i.e. a self-
assured ambition to make Turkey a global power.15 In his view, 
Turkey has all that it takes, including a strategic geographic loca-
tion at the intersection of many regions, thanks to which it can in-
fluence the entire “Afro-Eurasia”. It also has a large and dynamic 
population, a robust economy and a strong army. Finally, it can 
draw on the Ottoman heritage, which has the potential, thanks to 
its universalist nature, of peacefully attracting and uniting dif-
ferent nations and the Islamic world.16
In Davutoğlu’s interpretation, Turkey maintains deep links with 
the West due to its geographic location and the history of the 20th 
century alliance, but remains insurmountably separate from the 
13 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu, 
Stambuł: Küre Yayınları 2009, p. 558.
14 Ibidem, p. 262. 
15 Ibidem, p. 32-33.
16 Ibidem, p. 41-44, 90-93.
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Western world. That is because of the fundamental differences be-
tween the two sides, which date back to the origins of the Europe-
an and Muslim civilisations.17 Moreover, according to Davutoğlu, 
the Western civilisation has already reached the limits of its de-
velopment potential and has “said everything it had to say”.18 
At the tactical level, implementing Turkey’s global power strategy 
is supposed to involve the application of five principles formulated 
by Davutoğlu before he started his diplomatic career and imple-
mented later on.19 Firstly, in order to gain international legitima-
cy, Turkey must be a democratic state. Secondly, it should apply 
the rule of “zero conflicts with neighbours”, i.e. solve the prob-
lems in its relations with neighbours which undercut Turkey’s in-
ternational standing (this concerns the unresolved Cyprus ques-
tion, the frozen relations with Armenia, hostile relations with 
Syria, etc.). Thirdly, Ankara should develop closer co-operation 
with neighbouring regions and other parts of the world. To this 
end, it should act as a mediator between regional actors involved 
in conflicts and develop economic and cultural relations. Fourth-
ly, it should pursue a multidimensional policy, i.e. avoid exces-
sive dependence on any single international actor by developing 
complementary relations and alliances with other states and 
organisations. Finally, it should pursue a “rhythmic diplomacy”, 
17 In particular, those differences concern their ways of understanding real-
ity and the role ascribed to God in the world. According to Davutoğlu, such 
notions as religion, state or parliament are mutually untranslatable and in-
explicable in the two civilisations. Cf. the article prepared for the European 
International Studies Association conference in Warsaw in 2013; see İştar 
Gözaydın, Ahmet Davutoğlu: Role as an Islamic Scholar Shaping Turkey’s 
Foreign Policy, http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/war-
saw2013/Ahmet%20Davutoğlu.pdf
18 See the interview with Ahmet Davutoğlu on the condition of Western civi-
lisation and the fundamental discrepancies between Western and Islamic 
civilisations. Kerim Balcı, Philosophical depth: a scholarly talk with the 
Turkish foreign minister, Turkish Review, 1.10.2010, http://www.turkishre-
view.org/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=223051
19 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007, 
Insight Turkey, Vol. 10/No. 1, 2008. http://arsiv.setav.org/ups/dosya/9595.pdf
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i.e. maintain active, regular and as-frequent-as-possible contacts 
with foreign partners and be involved in as many international 
forums as it can. In this respect, the aim of Turkish diplomacy is 
to focus on long-term measures and laboriously and consistently 
build its international image and position.
Most of Davutoğlu’s works were written before he began his po-
litical career, in a different geopolitical reality, i.e. before Turkey’s 
Middle Eastern neighbourhood disintegrated, before the war in 
Syria started and before Iraq broke up. Nevertheless, the Turkish 
prime minister consistently stands by his original observations 
about Turkish policy and the global order. Whenever he under-
takes an attempt at self-reflection, he ends up even more con-
vinced that his views are correct. Many of Davutoğlu’s statements 
reveal a deep conviction that he has uncovered the essence of the 
dynamics of the current historical moment, or even the very laws 
of history. This is the source of his unfaltering faith that Turkey 
may become a global power, as long as it adheres to the principles 
outlined above, even if it appears to fail in the short term.20
20 Cf. the interview with Davutoğlu in Cairo Review, 12.03.2012, available at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-pub-
lished-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa
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ii. thE nEw turkish idEology in practicE
1. Circumstances 
The process whereby Turkey’s foreign policy has gradually be-
come subordinated to the New Turkish ideology has been inextri-
cably linked with the AKP leadership’s wider plan for a compre-
hensive transformation of Turkey’s identity, society and politics. 
It has gained momentum in recent years thanks to a favourable 
turn of the situation inside Turkey and internationally. 
Turkey’s domestic political scene has become dominated by the 
AKP. Opposition groups are weak, fragmented and cannot mount 
a serious challenge to the ruling party. The influence of the mili-
tary and the old establishment, which traditionally were the 
guardians of the state’s secularity and the pro-Western foreign 
policy course, has been minimised. All this has offered the Turk-
ish leadership freedom to pursue a policy that most fully reflects 
its ideological profile. 
Seeking to boost its popularity, the Turkish leadership has of-
ten resorted to populist, nationalist, Islamist, anti-Western and 
anti-Israeli slogans and gestures. It has been a self-propelled 
process: the slogans raised by the AKP leaders are taken up by 
an obliging media and the bureaucratic apparatus, and willing-
ly accepted among public opinion, which traditionally tends to 
trust the authority of their leaders and, as a result, the leaders 
thereby became hostages to slogans formulated for more or less 
provisional use.21
21 Cf. the unprecedentedly critical comments by the Turkish media on Turkey’s 
membership in NATO and the problems that Turkey and the USA stumbled on 
when they tried to agree a position on how to counter the Islamic State. http://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/10/turkey-nato-polarized-
membership.html?utm_source=Al-Monitor+Newsletter+[English]&utm_
campaign=9b6dff3b23-October_30_2014&utm_medium=email&utm_
term=0_28264b27a0-9b6dff3b23-100877877. 
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The human factor has played an important role here. Within the 
ruling party, power has been consolidating around Erdoğan, the 
long-time prime minister and current president, who displays an 
unshakeable self-confidence and views the internal situation and 
international affairs through the lens of the New Turkish ideology. 
With the help of the government-controlled (or self-controlling) 
media which dominate in the Turkish information space,22 and 
also aided by the state apparatus, Erdoğan has been creating an 
image of himself as the nation’s mentor whose role is not limited 
to effectively governing the state, but also includes making judge-
ments on moral and ideological issues concerning private and 
public life and international affairs.23 A similar image of a moral 
and intellectual authority has been built around prime minister 
Davutoğlu, albeit on a much smaller scale. This concentration of 
power in the hands of the president and, to a lesser extent, the 
prime minister means that the role of the professional diplomatic 
services has diminished. As a result Turkey’s foreign policy has 
been less and less defined by the caution and pragmatism typical 
of the diplomatic services, and increasingly informed by the char-
acters and ideology of Erdoğan and Davutoğlu.
Embarking on the pursuit of global power would be much more 
difficult without the impressive economic growth that Turkey 
experienced under the AKP government. Dependent on Inter- 
22 On the surface, the Turkish media scene seems well developed, but in reality 
freedom of the media in Turkey is subject to considerable limitations. Most 
media outlets are de facto controlled by the AKP or apply self-censorship. 
For more information, see the Special Report by Freedom House, Democracy 
in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey, 2014, https://freedom-
house.org/sites/default/files/Turkey%20Report%20-%202-3-14.pdf
23 For example, Erdoğan once argued that Muslims had discovered America be-
fore Columbus and anyone who did not believe that “had no respect for them-
selves”. A recurrent motif in Erdoğan’s speeches concerns the involvement of 
external “forces” in undermining the AKP’s rule. The conspirators include 
Israel, the West, Western media and the “interest lobby” (international finan-
cial organisations). The quotes were taken from: http://www.todayszaman.
com/national_Erdogan-disbelief-in-muslim-discovery-of-america-lack-of-
self-esteem_364672.html, http://www.ntv.com.tr/arsiv/id/25450624/
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national Monetary Fund loans just a decade ago, Turkey has be-
come a regional economic leader with a stable macroeconomic 
situation and rapidly growing standards of living, a G20 member, 
an IMF creditor and a generous development aid donor.24 This 
economic success has enabled Ankara to pursue an active foreign 
policy and present itself as a model of a modern, rapidly develop-
ing state vis-à-vis the stagnating or crisis-affected countries in the 
Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Africa.
The evolving international situation has also created favourable 
circumstances for the development of the New Turkish ideology. 
Once the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU was halted by 
the EU member states, the Turkish government was free to pur-
sue such policies and express such views that would risk harm-
ing that process if the admission of Turkey into the EU was still 
a real possibility.25 The stalemate in the accession negotiations 
thus partly lifted the limitations on Turkey’s ability to pursue an 
independent policy, often against the EU line, to criticise the West 
and use rhetoric with clear Islamist overtones.26
The United States’ policy towards the Middle East and Turkey has 
also contributed to this process. The invasion and occupation of 
Iraq and the subsequent unravelling of that country consolidated 
24 In 2013 Turkey spent more than US$ 4.3 billion on development aid. http://
www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/12/09/report-turkey-ranks-first-in-
international-humanitarian-aid 
25 The accession process was de facto suspended immediately after it was 
launched in 2005. The formal reason concerned Turkey’s refusal to recog-
nise Cyprus as a member of the Turkish-EU customs union, to which the EU 
member states responded by blocking certain negotiation chapters. How-
ever, the fact that EU member states are not interested in admitting Turkey 
to the EU is an important reason behind the impasse. 
26 For example, when the EU criticised the detention of the Zaman newspa-
per’s journalists in December 2014, Erdoğan responded by saying: “[The 
EU should] mind their own business. […] They say they will give a democ-
racy lesson to Turkey. Take the trouble to come here, so that Turkey can 
give you a lesson in democracy. [...] Turkey will not take advice from the 
EU”, http://www.afp.com/en/news/erdogan-says-eu-cant-give-turkey-de-
mocracy-lesson
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Turkey’s conviction that Washington was having a destabilising 
impact on the region.27 From Ankara’s point of view, the with-
drawal of US troops from Iraq in 2011 and Washington’s lack of 
interest in the region in the following years created a geopolitical 
vacuum in the Middle East. This vacuum has opened a space for 
shifts in the relations among regional actors, leaving Turkey with 
the choice between projecting its own vision of the Middle East-
ern order, or letting other players shape the region in line with 
their interests.
The outbreak of the Arab Spring was a particularly important fac-
tor. The AKP leadership believed that the collapse of authoritarian 
regimes in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt and the popular revolt against 
Assad in Syria proved its claim that the existing international sys-
tem (in which Turkey, too, had been marginalised) is now eroding. 
The Arab Spring elevated Turkey’s relations with the Arab world to 
a new level. Before, those relations were focused mainly on areas 
without a strong ideological dimension (such as trade exchange, 
visa relations, promotion of tourism, etc.). The advent of the Arab 
Spring brought to the forefront ideological and identity issues such 
as the scope of Turkey’s responsibility for Middle Eastern states and 
societies, questions about the region’s preferred political models or 
the role of Islam in the Middle East and in Turkey’s relations with 
other countries in the region. The New Turkish ideology was sup-
posed to offer answers to these questions.28
27 This conviction is reinforced by Washington’s policy towards the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, which favours Tel Aviv according to Ankara and gives 
it free rein to apply repressions against the Palestinians. 
28 The factors mentioned here explain the growing role of the New Turkish 
discourse in Ankara’s policy. Even though these were the political assump-
tions of the AKP team from its first years in power, it tried to justify its ac-
tions with practical reasons. Greater involvement in the Middle East was 
explained as an effort to find new markets for rapidly developing Turkish 
companies, rather than global power ambitions or aspirations to lead in the 
Muslim world. Rhetoric with Islamist overtones, and certainly anti-West-
ern rhetoric, was very rare; much more frequent were statements showing 
Turkey’s sense of shared values with Europe. During the first two terms of 
the AKP government, its representatives would also deny any claims about 
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Over the 12 years of the AKP’s rule, the significance of specific ide-
ological elements in the party’s worldview has undergone change. 
The attitude towards the West seems to have evolved most: the 
AKP is now much more sceptical about the West than it was dur-
ing its first years in power (assuming that the initial pro-Western 
policy was not just a tactical manoeuvre designed to neutralise 
the opposition, and stemmed from a sincere faith in European 
integration and the values behind it). Declarations about Turkey 
belonging to European civilisation were frequent just a couple of 
years ago, but now they have clearly given way to signs of Turkey’s 
self-identification as part of the Middle East and the Muslim com-
munity, which is represented as exploited, or even persecuted by 
the West.29 On the other hand, the belief in Turkey’s potential to 
be a global power and a regional leader seems to be the most con-
stant trait of the AKP’s worldview. It is an overarching element in 
the party’s ideology, to which all the other elements are subordi-
nated if the circumstances so require.
The framework of the AKP leaders’ specific worldview, convic-
tions and beliefs is one of the most important factors determining 
Ankara’s policy. The ideological factor has the greatest impact on: 
(1) Turkey’s policy towards the Middle East, (2) its aspiration to re-
vise relations with the West, and (3) the efforts to gain the status 
of a global power.
their nostalgia for the Ottoman past. See, for instance: “I am not a neo-Otto-
man, Davutoğlu says”, Today’s Zaman, 25.11.2009, http://www.todayszaman.
com/diplomacy_i-am-not-a-neo-ottoman-davutoglu-says_193944.html
29 E.g. the following statement by Erdoğan at the forum of the Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference: “Those who come from outside [the Muslim world] 
only like the oil, gold, diamonds, cheap workforce, conflicts and disputes of 
the lands of Islam. Believe me, they do not like us.” http://www.todaysza-
man.com/newsDetail.action;jsessionid=AJRdD--ItTTzDZj+GMLRah5Y?new
sId=365530&columnistId=0
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2. The “New Turkey” and the Middle East
Turkey’s global power aspirations, its self-identification as part 
of Asia and its nostalgia for a leading role in the Islamic world 
find the fullest embodiment in the AKP’s policy towards Muslim 
countries, especially the Middle East and North Africa. Building 
up power in that region has been the priority of Ankara’s policy, 
which it has consistently pursued for the last 12 years. Accord-
ing to the Turkish leadership, the region is of key importance for 
the global order. Therefore establishing itself as its patron would 
grant Turkey the status of a global power.30 However, Turkey’s at-
titude towards the region cannot be reduced solely to the pursuit 
of realpolitik, i.e. a calculated effort to optimise its own geopoliti-
cal position and minimise the threats coming from an unstable 
region. Neither is this policy solely about seeking new markets. 
From Ankara’s point of view, the stakes in the Middle East are 
higher. The Turkish leadership is guided by a strong belief in 
Turkey’s special mission as the successor of the Ottoman Empire 
and at the same time a modern, powerful state whose democratic 
government is an emanation of not only a single nation’s will, but 
also the hitherto suppressed historical and religious traditions of 
the entire region. Thus, as Turkey seeks to become the patron of 
the Ottoman Empire’s former territories and, more broadly, the 
entire Muslim world, this is not only a matter of security or the 
economy, but also a historical mission. 
30 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Clash of Interests: Perceptions, Journal of Internation-
al Affairs, December 1997-February 1998 Volume II, No. 4. According to 
Davutoğlu, the Middle East is a region of crucial importance for the world 
because of its straits on which global trade relies, its natural resource 
wealth, and its geographic location, which provides the key to the security 
of the entire “Afro-Eurasia”. It was because of the region’s importance that 
it became an arena of constant rivalry between external powers after the 
fall of the Ottoman Empire, which led to the formation of new, artificial 
states. As a result of the policy pursued by the West, which feared that de-
mocratisation in the Muslim states would inevitably lead to their Islamisa-
tion, power in those states was vested in the hands of authoritarian regimes 
disconnected from local traditions and focused on the pursuit of their own 
interests and the interests of the West.
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Under the AKP rule, no other direction of foreign policy has been 
developed as intensely as the Middle East. This tendency was al-
ready visible during the AKP’s first term in power when it man-
ifested itself in the policy of “zero problems with neighbours”.31 
Its assumptions ran counter to the original paradigm in which 
the neighbouring countries were perceived as threats. Now Tur-
key started seeing them as a space in which to project its own 
power and expansion ambitions. From Turkey’s point of view, its 
power stems not only from the rapidly growing strength of its 
economy (especially in comparison to the neighbouring states), 
but also, even more importantly, from the appeal of the Turkish 
political, social and cultural model, which reconciles traditional 
values and the Ottoman heritage with the demands of modernity 
(e.g. integration with the EU). The new pax Turcica formula was 
therefore supposed to offer an antidote to the region’s problems: 
political and religious conflicts, as well as socio-economic under-
development.
Before the Arab Spring, Turkey sought to establish itself as a re-
gional leader in three ways. Firstly, through intense diplomatic 
efforts, it sought to establish and maintain good political rela-
tions with nearly all the major actors in the region, including 
Syria, Iran, Iraqi Kurdistan, Libya, and the Gulf states. It re-
mained neutral in regional conflicts in order to be able to act 
as an honest broker and to build up its prestige and influence 
(e.g. in the conflict between Hamas and Fatah in Palestine, be-
tween Hamas and Israel in the years 2006 and 2008, between 
Syria and Israel in 2008, between the Shia and the Sunni in Iraq 
in 2010, or between Somaliland and the government of Somalia 
31 As part of the “zero problems” policy, Turkey also tried to repair or strength-
en its relations with the Balkan states, Cyprus and Armenia, but it appears 
that the Middle Eastern dimension of that policy was far more important for 
Ankara. For useful information about the AKP government’s policy towards 
selected Middle Eastern states, see: Eric S. Edelman, Svante E. Cornell, Aar-
on Lobel, Michael Makovsky, The Roots of Turkish Conduct: Understanding 
the Evolution of Turkish Policy in the Middle East, Bipartisan Policy Centre, 
December 2013. 
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since 2010). Secondly, it sought to build its image as a brotherly 
state and a model of successful modernisation in Islam-dominat-
ed countries. To this end, it promoted the Turkish culture and 
lifestyle (e.g. by large-scale student grant programmes, opening 
of Turkish universities and foundations in Muslim countries, 
launching Arab-language television channels and broadcasting 
Turkish soap operas), and also promoted tourism in Turkey and 
eased (or abolished) visa regimes. Thirdly, it effectively inten-
sified economic contacts, as demonstrated by the fact that the 
Middle East’s share in Turkey’s trade exchange increased from 
9% to 27 % between 2002 and 2012.32
The peak of Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East came with 
the advent of the Arab Spring. Ankara saw the erosion of the old 
order and the popular uprisings as an opportunity to transform 
the efforts it had hitherto made into real influence. It acted as the 
advocate of the “Arab street” against the crumbling regimes and 
subsequently supported the new governments in Tunisia, Egypt 
and initially in Libya. The Syrian conflict turned out to be the 
greatest challenge. When protests first started in Syria, Turkey 
tried to persuade Bashar al-Assad to implement democratic re-
forms, and when those efforts failed, it started to actively support 
the anti-Assad opposition and took other measures with a view to 
removing him from power, incurring a huge political and social 
cost and placing its own security at risk.
Turkey’s diplomacy towards the states and societies of the Middle 
East has been marked by a patronising style stemming from its 
sense of superiority and belief in the universality of the Turkish 
culture and development model. In contacts with the states and 
societies of the region, the Turkish government has consistently 
made references to a community of religion, shared history, and to 
brotherhood, whereby Turkey is usually represented as the “older 
32 According to figures of the Turkish Ministry of Economy. http://www.
ekonomi.gov.tr
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
4/
20
15
27
brother”.33  This “seniority” manifests itself for instance in Tur-
key’s tendency to relativize the sovereignty of its Middle Eastern 
partners. From Ankara’s point of view, between the fall of the Ot-
toman Empire and the outbreak of the Arab Spring the Arab states 
were governed by authoritarian regimes in many cases imposed by 
the West and disconnected from the local peoples and traditions, 
which meant that Turkey was authorised to make judgements 
about the internal situation of those countries (vis-à-vis Mubarak 
in Egypt during the protests in Tahrir Square, or Assad after the 
protests in Syria broke out). This also explains Turkey’s practice 
of establishing relations with selected political and social actors 
while sidestepping official governments: the development of in-
tense contacts with the Kurdistan Region in Iraq to the exclusion 
of Bagdad offers the most glaring example of this practice,34 others 
include the contacts with Hamas (rather than Fatah), or the close 
relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation which 
positions itself against most governments in the region. 
The ideologization of Turkey’s policy has also made it less flexible. 
It limits the Turkish leadership’s willingness to adjust policy to 
33 For example, Erdoğan and Davutoğlu often take part in joint prayers with 
officials and ordinary believers in the Muslim states they visit. This attitude 
is also visible in numerous statements by Turkish officials, e.g. Erdoğan, 
who said during his visit to Iran that Teheran was his second home, and 
during a visit to Algeria – that the Israeli operation in the Temple Mount in 
Jerusalem was tantamount to an attack against Turkey and Algeria. Quotes: 
http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/11/20/attacks-against-al-aqsa-
are-attacks-against-all-muslims-turkish-president-says, http://english.
alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/02/02/Turkey-s-rival-
Iran-is-Erdogan-s-second-home.html. Turkey also emphasises the mutual 
ties between Turkish society and the societies of other countries of the 
former Ottoman Empire, for instance by implying that the social and po-
litical problems of the partners (“brothers”) equally affect Turkey because 
it is home to large diasporas of nationals of countries in the region. Cf. 
Davutoğlu’s speech at Brookings Institution. http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/events/2010/11/29-turkey/20101129_turkey.pdf
34 In one notable case, Ahmet Davutoğlu visited Kirkuk without asking for 
Bagdad’s consent. The status of Kirkuk is the subject of dispute between the 
federal government and Iraqi Kurdistan. 
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the current situation, a tendency that has been on the rise in re-
cent years.35 It is visible in the way Turkey has been choosing its 
partners in the Middle East and in its steadfast support for those 
partners despite the high political costs and absence of any tangi-
ble benefits. The Muslim Brotherhood, which the AKP considers 
to be its ideological cousin, has been Turkey’s main partner in the 
Middle East in recent years. This choice has determined Turkey’s 
decision to opt for Hamas as its main partner in Palestine, instead 
of the more moderate and more influential Fatah. This preference 
became particularly visible after the Arab Spring, when Turkey 
stood by the Muslim Brotherhood not only when, under the lead-
ership of Mohamed Morsi, it formed the government of Egypt, but 
also after that government was ousted and the Brotherhood was 
in fact eliminated from political life in Egypt. In that case, ideo-
logical reasons prevailed over pragmatism, because Turkey has 
paid a price for continuing to support the Brotherhood: its rela-
tions with Cairo, a potentially important partner in the Middle 
East, have been frozen since.36 Ankara has pursued a similarly 
inflexible policy in relation to the Syrian opposition where it also 
favoured the Brotherhood, even though it immediately became 
marginalised within the ranks of the anti-Assad opposition.37 This 
35 Before the Arab Spring, Turkey tolerated social and political phenomena 
to which it has been principally opposed since the outbreak of protests. It 
looked the other way when people demonstrated in Iran after the presiden-
tial elections (2009), and was not bothered by the civil war in Sudan as it de-
veloped co-operation with Khartoum. Neither did it object to the corruption 
and lack of social legitimacy of the Arab regimes with which it co-operated 
intensively. See: Roots of Turkish Conduct... 
36 Turkey has already paid a dear price for supporting the Muslim Brother-
hood at that time: the cost of transporting Turkish goods via Egyptian terri-
tory, an important transport route to the Persian Gulf, increased consider-
ably. Cairo has started energy co-operation with the Republic of Cyprus and 
Greece, which was clearly aimed against Turkey, and, together with Saudi 
Arabia, effectively blocked Turkey’s efforts to obtain the status of tempo-
rary Security Council member in the UN in 2014. 
37 Turkey backed the Syrian National Council (SNC), in which the Muslim 
Brotherhood was a dominant player, until November 2012, when the SNC 
joined a broader National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposi-
tion Forces. In the new organisation, the Brotherhood’s position was much 
weaker than in the SNC. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and Qatar became the 
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not only undermined Turkey’s influence on the Syrian opposition 
but also adversely affected its relations with the Gulf States, and 
especially Saudi Arabia, with which Turkey could co-operate on 
the crucial issue of the Syrian conflict, if only it followed a more 
flexible and pragmatic policy towards the rebels.38
The “New Turkish” ideology is also reflected in Turkey’s policy to-
wards Islamic State (ISIS), which has made considerable gains in 
Syria and Iraq in 2014. At the level of declarations, Ankara consid-
ers Islamic State to be a terror organisation, but at the same time it 
follows a more lenient policy towards it than any other state in the 
region and did not participate in the anti-terror operation initi-
ated by the United States in Syria and Iraq in 2014. While it is clear 
to any external observer that Islamic State poses a direct threat 
to Turkey,39 Ankara invariably locates the sources of instability in 
the Middle East in the continued existence of the Assad regime 
and considers Islamic State to be a secondary problem. This is an-
other illustration of how Turkey’s policy is based on a long-term 
outlook, unwilling to make ad hoc tactical adjustments. Turkey 
believes that the country is capable of tackling even the most 
dangerous problems in the Middle East on its own, without co-
operating with other actors, or even by acting against them.40 
main patrons of the new grouping, as a result of which Turkey lost much of 
its sway over the Syrian opposition. While Ankara backed the new forma-
tion and has been providing logistical support to it, Turkey is no longer as 
committed to the Syrian opposition on the international stage as it used to 
be in the times of the SNC. 
38 There are many indications that Turkey maintains informal, working re-
lations with various opposition and militant groups in Syria and tolerates 
their presence in Turkish territory. This does not change the fact that An-
kara does not have any important political partners among the Syrian op-
position. 
39 For instance, Jihadi militants have kidnapped the staff of the Turkish consu-
late in Mosul, and Turkish police forces have been involved in armed clashes 
with Jihadi militants, with casualties on the Turkish side).
40 Szymon Ananicz, Tough decisions for Turkey in the war against Islamic 
State, OSW Analyses, 15.10.2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/anal-
yses/2014-10-15/tough-decisions-turkey-war-against-islamic-state
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At the same time, it demonstrates Turkey’s liberal attitude to-
wards radical Islam.
3. Revising the alliance with the West
Ankara’s ambition to revise its alliance with the West is another 
example of how Turkey’s foreign policy is subordinated to the New 
Turkish ideology. Turkey believes that the West, and especially 
the United States, is still the strongest pole of global politics but its 
power is eroding. The West remains an important economic and 
security partner for Ankara and still serves as a point of reference 
(although no longer a model) in terms of internal modernisation. 
However, the AKP leaders no longer want to continue the policy of 
the “old Turkey”, which in their view satisfied itself with the sta-
tus of the EU’s weaker partner, one that was lower on the ladder of 
civilizational advancement and aspired to join an exclusive club. 
Neither do they want Turkey to be the United States’ bridgehead 
in its Middle Eastern policy, or a passive bulwark against Islam-
ic radicalism and instability in the Arab world, as was supposed 
to be the case under the previous governments. Instead Turkey 
now seeks to be independent in its foreign and internal policies. It 
wants to shape its relations with other actors in the Middle East 
and elsewhere, independently of the West’s preferences. Never-
theless, it expects the West to respect its interests in mutual rela-
tions and regional affairs. 
At the core of Turkey’s relations with the West are the EU acces-
sion process, the alliance with the United States and its member-
ship in NATO. The impact that the new ideology has had in these 
three areas is very clear. Over the 12 years of AKP rule, Turkey’s 
attitude towards European integration has evolved from one of 
initial enthusiasm and active efforts to gain membership, towards 
deep scepticism, stagnating negotiations and considerable slow-
ing down of the EU-modelled reforms, and even towards a rise 
in authoritarianism. While Ankara explains this away with the 
obstructionism of Cyprus, France and Germany, it seems that if 
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Turkey itself were more committed to integration with the EU, it 
would continue the internal reforms regardless of the actual sta-
tus of the accession process. In this way, it would be implementing 
its declared objectives concerning social, political and economic 
development, and would undermine the arguments of those EU 
member states which are sceptical about Turkey’s European aspi-
rations. In the absence of such efforts, it may appear that Turkey 
is not convinced about integration with Europe and has been in-
strumentally using the accession process to its internal ends. Such 
suspicions seem all the more plausible if one takes into account 
the fact that the weakening of Turkey’s pro-EU aspirations has co-
incided with the consolidation of power in the hands of the AKP. 
The party currently has no serious rivals on the political stage and 
does not need the argument of the accession process in political 
battles, as was the case during AKP’s first two terms in power. 
Turkey’s turning away from the EU is not merely a response to 
the expectations of public opinion, which is increasingly sceptical 
about the EU, since the AKP team themselves actively contribute 
to creating and perpetuating a negative image of the West among 
the public in Turkey.
In its relations with Brussels, Ankara has been ever more fre-
quently and vocally challenging the European Union’s authority 
to make judgements about the state of Turkish democracy. It has 
been calling into question the EU’s political and economic model 
and accusing the EU of Islamophobia and indifference in the face of 
the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria, all emphasising Europe’s 
aversion towards Muslims.41 The Turkish leadership, and presi-
dent Erdoğan in particular, have been building an image of the 
European Union and, more broadly, the West, as conspirators in-
tent on undermining the AKP government, and therefore Turkey 
as such, through direct actions (plots, hostile media campaigns) 
or alliances with the government’s rivals inside Turkey (including 
41 http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/gundem/Erdogandan-islam-dunyasina-ca-
gri-2031418
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the PKK or the Fethullah Gülen movement).42 It seems that those 
efforts are not just an attempt at deflecting responsibility for Tur-
key’s internal problems (e.g. the crisis over Gezi Park in 2013), but 
are an expression of leading AKP politicians’ genuine mistrust of 
Europe and its real intentions in relation to Turkey, which dates 
back to the time when the AKP leaders were still members of Millî 
Görüş and the West was supporting the Kemalist governments, 
viewing them as a bulwark against the Islamisation of Turkey.
The economy is another area in Turkey’s relations with the EU 
where important value shifts have taken place. The evolution of 
the southern gas transit corridor project offers a very clear exam-
ple of this. According to the EU’s original plans, the role of Turkey 
in that project was to be limited to providing a transit corridor 
between the Caspian region and Europe. However, the TANAP 
project that has been pushed through by Ankara (and Baku) puts 
Turkey in the position of the main player in terms of gas supplies 
to the EU market as well as the main beneficiary (by improving its 
energy security, ensuring diversification of supplies and grant-
ing it a substantial degree of control over the infrastructure).43 
A similar logic is behind Ankara’s talks with Russia about the con-
struction of a new gas pipeline across Turkey’s territory to the EU 
border, as an alternative to the South Stream, which are on-going 
despite the political and economic confrontation taking place be-
tween the EU and Russia (the sanctions).44 Ankara has also been 
42 This was how the authorities interpreted the outbreak of social protests in 
Turkey in the summer of 2013 and the corruption scandal involving high-
ranking officials in December 2013. 
43 Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, Turkey is filling the gap being left by the West in 
the Southern Corridor, OSW Analyses, 4.06.2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/analyses/2014-06-04/turkey-filling-gap-being-left-west-
southern-corridor
44 The talks were officially opened during Vladimir Putin’s visit to Turkey in 
December 2014. See: Szymon Kardaś, The unwanted gas pipeline: Russia has 
halted the construction of South Stream, OSW Analyses, 3.12.2014, http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-12-03/unwanted-gas-pipe-
line-russia-has-halted-construction-south-stream
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
4/
20
15
33
increasingly assertive in trade relations and has been question-
ing the provisions of the Turkish-EU customs union, which, in its 
view, mainly benefits the EU member states.45
In its relations with NATO and the United States, Turkey also 
clearly aspires to gain a more independent status and revise the 
terms of co-operation. Especially with regard to the Middle East 
and North Africa, there have been very few situations in recent 
years in which Turkey’s interests were in line with those of the 
USA and other NATO allies. On the other hand, there have been 
many situations which revealed significant differences between 
the two sides: for instance when Ankara refused to allow the 
United States to use its territory in the invasion of Iraq, main-
tained friendly relations with Syria and supported it politically 
(especially after the assassination of the Lebanese prime minister 
Rafik Hariri in 2005), established diplomatic relations with Ha-
mas (considered by the West to be a terror organisation) in 2006, 
pursued an anti-Israeli policy,46 tried to bypass the West’s negotia-
tions with Teheran on the Iranian nuclear programme,47 attempt-
ed to independently play the situation in the South Caucasus 
after the war in Georgia,48 initially objected to the intervention 
45 See the article by the former Turkish minister for the economy and taxes: 
http://www.turkishpolicy.com/dosyalar/files/2012-1-HayatiYazici.pdf
46 Turkey became critical of Israel after the latter launched the Cast Lead oper-
ation in the Gaza Strip in 2008–2009, without notifying Turkey in advance 
of the move. Ankara was involved in mediations between Israel and Syria at 
that time and perceived the absence of notice as a humiliation. Another cri-
sis came with the 2009 conference in Davos where a row took place between 
prime minister Erdoğan and the Israeli president Shimon Peres. Relations 
between the two countries were frozen after the attack of Israeli comman-
dos on a ship carrying humanitarian assistance to Gaza in 2010, in which 
9 Turkish nationals were killed. In 2013 Israel apologised for the killings. 
This paved the way to talks about normalisation of bilateral relations. How-
ever, those negotiations have been stalled. 
47 In May 2010 Turkey, Brazil and Iran negotiated an agreement that was sup-
posed to solve the problem of Iran’s nuclear programme. In this way, they 
bypassed the negotiation format established by the West. However, the 
Turkish-Brazilian initiative was ultimately rejected by the United States. 
48 After the war in Georgia in 2008, Turkey came up with a proposal addressed 
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in Libya, looked the other way when Al-Qaeda and other Jihadi 
groups were expanding operations in Syria, refused to take part 
in the anti-terrorist operation in Iraq and Syria, and remained 
passive vis-à-vis the Russia annexation of Crimea.49
It is also Turkey’s objective to become ever more independent and 
self-sufficient in terms of security policy, an ambition that is clearly 
visible in Ankara’s decisions concerning arms purchases. Turkey’s 
decision in 2013 to open negotiations with China concerning the 
purchase of an air defence system, taken despite strong opposition 
from NATO allies and their protests that the system would not be 
integrated with NATO systems, is a case in point. Turkey took that 
decision because it would offer its domestic companies opportuni-
ties to participate in the production of the system and was in line 
with Turkey’s ambition to maximise the share of its domestic de-
fence industry in new purchases of arms and military equipment 
for the army. In this way, Ankara seeks to become relatively self-
sufficient in terms of defence and be independent from the West, 
even at the expense of major tensions in relations with allies.50
4. Towards global power status
The “New Turkey’s” ambitions are not limited to the neighbouring 
region but also extend to Ankara’s active participation in the shap-
ing of the global political stage and having a say on issues that are 
to Russia and the South Caucasus states to create a Caucasus Platform of Sta-
bility and Co-operation. According to Ankara’s plans, the West was not sup-
posed to participate in the new organisation.
49 See: Szymon Ananicz, Turkey on the Russian military intervention in 
Crimea, OSW Analyses, 5.03.2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
analyses/2014-03-05/turkey-russian-military-intervention-crimea
50 Those objectives are reflected in a number of arms programmes that Tur-
key has been implementing for the navy, the army and the air force. It has 
yet to be decided if the contract will be awarded. See: Szymon Ananicz, 
Andrzej Wilk, Friction between Turkey and NATO?, OSW Analyses, http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-10-02/friction-between-
turkey- and-nato
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of no immediate concern or of limited importance for the Turks. 
Turkey has been trying to build an image of itself as a constructive 
state co-deciding on the world’s most important problems, work-
ing to foster dialogue between civilisations and especially inter-
ested in making sure that the rights of Muslim societies are re-
spected.51 Ankara’s policy towards the United Nations illustrates 
those aspirations. Thanks to diplomatic efforts, Turkey earned 
the status of a temporary member of the US Security Council in 
the years 2009–2010. In that period Turkey focused on global se-
curity issues such as the problems of North Korea, the Democrat-
ic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan and the international co-
operation in the fight against terrorism, while putting less focus 
on local issues of direct concern to itself. It tried to renew its seat 
on the Security Council in 2014 (without success) by organising 
a large-scale diplomatic offensive and promotional campaign to 
this end.52 Together with Spain, Turkey managed to promote the 
“Alliance of Civilisations” initiative within the United Nations, 
the objective of which is to overcome prejudice and promote dia-
logue between religions and cultures. Ankara has been one of the 
most vocal advocates of a reform of the United Nations. It has been 
questioning the overrepresentation of the West in the Security 
Council and the absence of emerging powers such as Turkey, Bra-
zil or India. In recent years it has also objected ever more strongly 
against the obstructionism of Russia and China, which has para-
lysed the UN in the face of the war in Syria.
Under AKP rule, Ankara has also stepped up its activity within the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference, where it managed to have 
a Turk, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, appointed as the Organisation’s 
51 The visit of Pope Francis to Turkey in 2014 may serve as an example – on that 
occasion president Erdoğan tried to act as a representative of the entire Is-
lamic world vis-à-vis the head of the Catholic Church and called for an end to 
Islamophobia in Europe. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/in-historic-
visit-pope-hopes-turkey-can-be-great-peacemaker-Erdogan-slams-islam-
ophobia-isil.aspx?pageID=238&nid=74945 
52 See the dedicated website to promote Turkey as a UN Security Council mem-
ber: http://www.turkey4unsc.org/
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secretary general for two terms, i.e. for ten years in total. Ankara 
has also tried to reinvigorate the D8 organisation as an alternative 
to the G7. The breadth of its ambition is visible in the fact that it 
has gained observer status within the African Union, takes part 
in meetings of the Arab League, and has established informal 
partnerships with the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), 
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 53
Turkey has also been seeking closer relations with more distant 
states and has been working to build influence in regions such 
as Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia or Latin America. To this 
end, it has intensified contacts with such regional powers as Chi-
na, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, South Africa or Brazil, 
as well as smaller states of regional importance. The purpose of 
those contacts is not only to strengthen economic contacts – they 
also concern political and security issues, even if such issues do 
not have any direct bearing on Turkey’s interests. Ankara’s medi-
ations between the federal government of Somalia and the sepa-
ratist Somaliland or its large-scale military training programmes 
for the armies of Bangladesh or Afghanistan are some of the ex-
amples which illustrate this.54
Finally, Ankara has been generously funding efforts to expand its 
influence in areas that Turkish diplomacy had previously neglect-
ed. The substantial amounts it has been spending on develop-
ment aid (in total, more than US$ 4.3 billion in 201355) have been an 
53 For more information see: Adam Balcer, Turkey Goes Global, Demos Europa, 
2012, http://www.demosservices.home.pl/www/files/Turkey_goes_global_
implications_for_the_EU_PP_A_Balcer.pdf
54 More than 3000 officers of the army of Bangladesh have been trained in Tur-
key since 2004, and since 2001, around 3300 Afghan troops have undergone 
training in the Turkish army’s training centres. In 2011, Turkey launched 
a programme to train 15000 Afghan police officers. 
55 See: http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/12/09/report-turkey-ranks-
first-in-international-humanitarian-aid. For more information, see: OECD 
Development Co-operation Report 2014, p. 386. 
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important instrument in this respect. The funds are directed not 
only to neighbouring states (where recently they have been pri-
marily directed to the Syrian refugees), but also to more distant 
countries such as Pakistan, Somalia, Afghanistan or Kyrgyzstan.
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iii. thE nEw turkish idEology and turkEy’s 
intErnational standing 
Two periods can be distinguished in analysing the impact that the 
implementation of the New Turkish ideology has had on Turkey’s 
international position. The first one spanned from the AKP’s rise 
to power to the outbreak of the Arab Spring and was a time when 
Turkey considerably strengthened its position on the internation-
al stage. From the Western point of view, Turkey’s new, active for-
eign policy of that time, buttressed by a dynamically developing 
economy and internal democratic transformation, had a stabilis-
ing effect on the surrounding region. In particular, the policy of 
“zero problems with neighbours” had a very positive reception as 
it offered an opportunity to resolve the Cyprus issue and normal-
ise relations with Armenia. The rapprochement with Syria and 
Iran was less welcome, but it was treated as understandable given 
Turkey’s geographic position. With Ankara’s influence in its inter-
national surroundings rising, the EU could hope to be able to pur-
sue its interests more effectively through Turkey, i.e. to strengthen 
the European Neighbourhood Policy in the Caucasus, keep Russia’s 
global power ambitions in the Black Sea region in check, and ease 
conflicts and promote modern, secular development model in the 
Middle East. Those expectations were reinforced by the convic-
tion that Ankara was determined to pursue integration with the 
EU, which gave the Union a sense that it held some sway over Tur-
key’s policy. The country’s global power ambitions were not seen 
as a product of political ideology, but rather a natural consequence 
of Turkey’s burgeoning economic and political status. There was 
therefore no concern that Turkey could adopt a fundamentally dif-
ferent perspective on international affairs.
The AKP’s policy also had a positive reception in the Middle East. 
Countries of the region welcomed Turkey’s efforts to build closer 
relations with them as an opportunity to expand their econom-
ic contacts. For those whose relations with the West were frigid 
(Syria, Iran, Libya), relations with Turkey were a way to mitigate 
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the impact of international isolation. Ankara was also helpful in 
easing regional or domestic tensions, e.g. when it persuaded the 
Sunnis not to boycott the Iraqi government in 2010 or acted as 
a mediator between Syria and Israel in 2008. Finally, when rela-
tions between Ankara and Tel Aviv broke down, Turkey was seen 
as a new ally in the Middle Eastern states’ rivalry with Israel. The 
Middle East countries die not see Turkey as a threat to the region-
al order or to their own political systems. 
The second period started with the outbreak of the Arab Spring. 
At that time it became clear that there were widening differences 
in the understanding of the international order between Turkey 
and its partners, and as a result, their relations soured rapidly. 
For Ankara, the Arab Spring and the transformations it triggered 
in the Middle East were primarily a cue for Turkey to accomplish 
its historical mission and reclaim its position as a regional power, 
but the West saw the developments in the region as highly unde-
sirable. While Turkey tried to actively play the local conflicts and 
got involved in the rivalry between individual groups and fac-
tions, for instance by backing the Muslim Brotherhood or becom-
ing entangled in conflicts with the Islamic State, the West sought 
a restoration of the status quo ante, i.e. first and foremost, stability 
of the Middle Eastern states (with unchanged borders), the rule 
of secular forces as an alternative to the Islamists (including the 
Muslim Brotherhood), and guarantees of security for Israel. The 
gap between the positions of the West and of Turkey widened fur-
ther because Turkey strongly emphasised the moral superiority 
of its policy and the duplicity and opportunism of the European 
Union and the United States. This situation coincided with a re-
gression of democratic standards in Turkey and the rise of author-
itarianism, accompanied by the conservative-religious and often 
anti-Western rhetoric. This further contributed to alienating Tur-
key from its Western partners. 
Differences also emerged between Turkey and the Middle East-
ern states. The regional actors saw no need to accept Turkey’s 
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leadership. They interpreted Ankara’s references to the shared 
Ottoman past, which were no longer as veiled as they had been in 
previous years, merely as an expression of Turkey’s particular na-
tionalism, rather than a universal spiritual heritage or an attrac-
tive political programme for the region. Ankara lost its credibility 
as an honest broker who could come up with broadly acceptable 
proposals for a new regional order after it unequivocally chose 
sides in a series of conflicts, i.e. backed the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Syria against Assad and the Syrian Kurds, supported the Broth-
erhood in Egypt as they strove to gain power against the military 
dictatorship, and sided with the Kurdistan Region and the Sunni 
minority against Al-Maliki’s regime in Iraq. In other Middle East-
ern countries involved in the region’s conflicts, Turkey’s image 
also deteriorated: in particular, this refers to Saudi Arabia, Iran 
and Egypt, which perceive Turkey’s activities as a threat to their 
own regional interests and their internal political legitimacy. The 
players whom Turkey supports (the Muslim Brotherhood, the Free 
Syrian Army, the Iraqi Kurds) have not been too willing to accept 
Turkey’s patronage, either. They are aware that Turkey’s backing 
is limited to actions which are “soft” by Middle Eastern standards 
and that Ankara is not prepared to use force, and therefore cannot 
significantly change the situation in a region ruptured by wars 
and crises. 
To an external observer, Turkey’s policy could seem like a fiasco, 
and its international position as risky isolation. However, the AKP 
leadership does not share this diagnosis. Their foreign policy is 
founded on deeply held ideological assumptions and buttressed 
by a strong belief that they correctly understand the dynamics of 
history. This means that Turkish foreign policy is not intended to 
produce immediate results, but rather to reach objectives in the 
long term, yet with a guaranteed prospect of success. Ankara is 
therefore less willing to adjust its foreign policy strategy and tac-
tics ad hoc, because it is ideology, and not the current balance of 
power or current developments, that is the point of reference for 
its assessment of the situation. The statement by Ibrahim Kalın, 
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one the leading AKP politicians and ideologues who described 
Turkey’s position on the international stage as being “alone in vir-
tue” (değerli yalnızlık), sums up the Turkish leadership’s unwill-
ingness to adjust their policies and act more flexibly: being alone 
may be impractical in the short term but is a commendable stance 
because it stems from a correct moral choice and a true under-
standing of the nature of history.56
56 The concept of being “alone in virtue” has also been embraced by Turkey’s 
current minister of foreign affairs. When commenting on Turkey’s failure 
to obtain the temporary seat on the UN Security Council as a result of ob-
jections from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, among others, he said that Turkey 
was alone because it had been isolated by the entire United Nations, but he 
preferred this kind of solitude to co-operation with the Egyptian regime. 
See: http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/177195/incirlik-airbase-for-anti-
isil-coalition-to-be-part-of-a-single-package-turkish-fm.html
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iv. conclusions and prospEcts
Turkey’s foreign policy over the last 12 years has been very con-
sistent in its strategic assessment of the country’s national inter-
est, international developments, as well as the ambition to play 
an increasingly important role in the region and in the world. 
The Turkish leadership has remained faithful to the ideological 
underpinnings of its policy. If that policy line gets corrected, it is 
usually as a result of sudden and significant international devel-
opments in Turkey’s surroundings or the country’s own failures 
or limitations (which Turkey views as transitory, nonetheless). 
However, such corrections do not undermine the conviction that 
the strategic vision defined by the New Turkish ideology is valid.
Turkey’s foreign policy is closely linked with the country’s internal 
policies and is an inherent element of the New Turkey which the 
AKP government has been trying to build. It is therefore unlikely 
that Turkey would thoroughly revise its internal policy without 
changing foreign policy, or alter foreign policy without a shift in 
internal policy. Given Turkey’s current political setup, it is also un-
likely that the country will change the objectives and directions of 
its foreign policy of its own volition in the coming years, although 
it may make some tactical adjustments, enter periods of greater or 
lesser activity, or change its rhetoric (as has been the case to date).
The implementation of the New Turkish ideology has created 
a major challenge for relations between the West and Turkey. The 
difference between the two sides’ perceptions of the world has 
been widening, and the community of values professed by the two 
sides in previous years has been giving way to a shaky communi-
ty of interests and a sense of civilizational separateness. It seems 
ever less realistic that Turkey will continue to seek integration 
with the European Union. There are also deepening differences in 
the two sides’ views of NATO (which manifest themselves in the 
context of both the Middle East and Russia). The process whereby 
Turkey has been drifting away from the West is also driven by 
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internal developments, including the rising authoritarian ten-
dencies in Turkey. Economic ties should remain an important 
linking element, because Turkey has no alternative to economic 
co-operation with the EU. However, this factor will merely miti-
gate the differences, and will not create positive impulses for the 
development of strategic co-operation. 
While the Middle East has been the most important direction of 
foreign policy for the AKP government, relations with the Middle 
Eastern partners have not compensated for Turkey’s weakened 
ties with the West. The New Turkish ideology is as foreign to most 
players in the Middle East as it is to the West. The Middle Eastern 
partners are not interested in accepting Ankara’s patronage, do 
not share its diagnoses of the regional situation and do not sub-
scribe to the solutions to crises proposed by Turkey.
Given the persistence with which Turkey has been following its 
ideological assumptions in the Middle East despite the absence of 
visible results, no significant shift in its policy should be expected 
in the coming years. This, in turn, means that Turkey will likely 
become further entangled in the problems of the Middle East, be-
come ever more isolated in its policies. The costs of this policy will 
likely exceed the gains. They include the risk of Middle Eastern 
instability spilling over to Turkey itself. 
At the same time, it should be noted that Turkey has demonstrated 
its ability to make radical turns in its Middle Eastern policy (e.g. 
in relation to the Iraqi Kurds or the Assad regime before and af-
ter the outbreak of the Arab Spring), while all the time believing 
it was sticking to its course. This warrants caution in predicting 
Turkey’s tactics in the region. However, it is unlikely that Ankara 
will give up its guiding principle, i.e. the ambition to establish it-
self as a regional power.
Internal political developments will ultimately determine the fu-
ture of Turkey’s foreign policy. That policy is inextricably linked 
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with the AKP and its leaders (especially Erdoğan and Davutoğlu). 
Today in Turkey there seems to be no realistic alternative to the 
AKP and Erdoğan (and in the context of foreign policy, also to 
Davutoğlu), which justifies the conclusion that Turkey will likely 
continue with its present policy. However, it may also happen that 
Ankara will have to curb its ambitions in the event of a major in-
ternal political or economic destabilisation. 
szymon ananicz
